Yes. And, favorable selection to member-funded DPC is likely even greater than that already actuarially documented for employer funded DPC. [D]o economic forces lead to healthier patients self-selecting to a DPC practice? . . . . . . The value proposition for chronically ill patients– needing frequent visits and savings on ancillary services (labs, meds,Continue reading “Do economic forces lead to healthier patients self-selecting to member- funded DPC practice?”
Tag Archives: risk adjustment
Nextera and Paladina (Everside): a race to the top of Mount Brag
Updated 9/4/21 In 2015, Qliance still towered over all in the Direct Primary Care Bragging World with its claim of 20% overall cost reductions. Even that, of course, was quite a come down from the extravagant claims previously spewed under the Qliance banner; fond memories still linger of those heady days when the Heritage FoundationContinue reading “Nextera and Paladina (Everside): a race to the top of Mount Brag”
Shorter KPI Ninja/Nextera SVVSD report
“We used a statistically valid risk measurement tool and determined that there was a a non-Nextera population had a 7.5% difference greater level of risk then our Nextera population. But don’t believe that result, because it was not statistically valid.” “We reduced inpatient hospital 92.7%. Want to know how great we are? Our statistically validContinue reading “Shorter KPI Ninja/Nextera SVVSD report”
KPI Ninja/Nextera report: every single cost comparison has a 10% benefit design error.
In KPI Ninja’s “School District Claims Analysis” comparing claims costs under the Nextera plan and the competing fee for service (Choice) plan, the “Analyst” overlooked two major differences between the plans in how the “School District” pays “Claims“. Nextera members pay post-deductible coinsurance at a 20% rate and the district pays an 80% share. ButContinue reading “KPI Ninja/Nextera report: every single cost comparison has a 10% benefit design error.”
KPI Ninja’s Nextera risk measurement charade
Abstract: The Nextera “study” by KPI Ninja misappropriated the prestige of a Johns Hopkins research team to support its risk measurement claims; relied on an undisclosed and unvalidated methodology for obtaining population risk measurements; obtained highly dubious risk measurement results; and sharply mischaracterized the significance of those results. In the end, because applying even theirContinue reading “KPI Ninja’s Nextera risk measurement charade”
KPI Ninja’s Nextera analysis: more than enough problems.
Three major adjustments are needed, even without correcting the IP admit rate problem or arriving at a more reasonable risk adjustment. Comparing data from Nextera patients and non-Nextera patients in the SVVSD programs requires three major adjustments which KPI Ninja never attempted. Computations here. Because of the different benefit structures, the district’s claim costs forContinue reading “KPI Ninja’s Nextera analysis: more than enough problems.”
KPI Ninja’s Nextera study: a “single blunder” introduction
The KPI Ninja report on Nextera’s school district program claims big savings when employees chose Nextera’s direct primary care rather than traditional primary care. But the analysis reflects inadequacy of a high order. Here’s a starter course of cluelessness, actually one the report’s smaller problems. The report ignored the effect of an HRA made availableContinue reading “KPI Ninja’s Nextera study: a “single blunder” introduction”
Nextera did not reduce inpatient hospital admissions by 92.7%.
Abstract: KPI Ninja’s report on Nextera’s direct primary care plan for employees of a Colorado school district clinic claims profoundly good results: nearly $1000 per year in savings for every Nextera clinic member and a staggering 92.7% reduction in inpatient hospital admissions. Both claims rest on the proposition that a population of middle-aged. middle-class, white-collar,Continue reading “Nextera did not reduce inpatient hospital admissions by 92.7%.”
DPC cherry-picking: the defense speaks. Part 2.
Update: In the fall of 2020, KPI Ninja released the first study that relies on it’s new risk information technology. I find it sadly opaque. Recap of Part 1 The direct primary care community has long tried to support claims that DPC reduces overall health care costs by 20% to 40% with non-risk-adjusted cost-reduction dataContinue reading “DPC cherry-picking: the defense speaks. Part 2.”
DPC cherry-picking: the defense speaks. Part 1.
Jump to Part 2. Within days of the Milliman report warning of the “imperative to control for patient selection in DPC studies [lest] differences in cost due to underlying patient differences  be erroneously assigned as differences caused by DPC”, the first rumbling of resistance from the DPC advocacy community emerged. This was a suggestion,Continue reading “DPC cherry-picking: the defense speaks. Part 1.”