Shorter KPI Ninja/Nextera SVVSD report

“Our statistically valid risk measurement was accurate enough to support our bragging when we say so, but not accurate enough to refute our bragging when anyone else says so. Although we used only about $10 million out of nearly $15 million dollars in claims data, rest assured that the missing millions can only reinforce ourContinue reading “Shorter KPI Ninja/Nextera SVVSD report”

KPI Ninja/Nextera report: every single cost comparison has an 8.5% benefit design error.

In KPI Ninja’s “School District Claims Analysis” comparing claims costs under the Nextera plan and the competing fee for service (Choice) plan, the “Analyst” overlooked two major differences between the plans in how the “School District” pays “Claims“.   Nextera members pay post-deductible coinsurance at a 20% rate and the district pays an 80% share. ButContinue reading “KPI Ninja/Nextera report: every single cost comparison has an 8.5% benefit design error.”

KPI Ninja’s Nextera risk measurement charade

Abstract: The Nextera “study” by KPI Ninja misappropriated the prestige of a Johns Hopkins research team to support its risk measurement claims; relied on an undisclosed and unvalidated methodology for obtaining population risk measurements; obtained highly dubious risk measurement results; and sharply mischaracterized the significance of those results. In the end, because applying even theirContinue reading “KPI Ninja’s Nextera risk measurement charade”

KPI Ninja’s Nextera analysis: more than enough problems.

Three major adjustments are needed, even without correcting the IP admit rate problem or arriving at a more reasonable risk adjustment. Comparing data from Nextera patients and non-Nextera patients in the SVVSD programs requires three major adjustments which KPI Ninja never attempted. Computations here. Because of the different benefit structures, the district’s claim costs forContinue reading “KPI Ninja’s Nextera analysis: more than enough problems.”

KPI Ninja’s Nextera study: a “single blunder” introduction

The KPI Ninja report on Nextera’s school district program claims big savings when employees chose Nextera’s direct primary care rather than traditional primary care. But the analysis reflects inadequacy of a high order. Here’s a starter course of cluelessness, actually one the report’s smaller problems. The report ignored the effect of an HRA made availableContinue reading “KPI Ninja’s Nextera study: a “single blunder” introduction”

Nextera did not reduce inpatient hospital admissions by 92.7%.

Abstract: KPI Ninja’s report on Nextera’s direct primary care plan for employees of a Colorado school district clinic claims profoundly good results: nearly $1000 per year in savings for every Nextera clinic member and a staggering 93.7% reduction in inpatient hospital admissions. Both claims rest on the proposition that a population of middle-aged. middle-class, white-color,Continue reading “Nextera did not reduce inpatient hospital admissions by 92.7%.”

DPC cherry-picking: the defense speaks. Part 2.

Update: In the fall of 2020, KPI Ninja released the first study that relies on it’s new risk information technology. I find it sadly opaque. Recap of Part 1 The direct primary care community has long tried to support claims that DPC reduces overall health care costs by 20% to 40% with non-risk-adjusted cost-reduction dataContinue reading “DPC cherry-picking: the defense speaks. Part 2.”

DPC cherry-picking: the defense speaks. Part 1.

Jump to Part 2. Within days of the Milliman report warning of the “imperative to control for patient selection in DPC studies [lest] differences in cost due to underlying patient differences [] be erroneously assigned as differences caused by DPC”, the first rumbling of resistance from the DPC advocacy community emerged. This was a suggestion,Continue reading “DPC cherry-picking: the defense speaks. Part 1.”

Epiphany. Dr Gross’s risk adjustment metholodogy for direct primary care stands contrary to contemporary understandings of how to assess the relative expected costs of differing populations.

Dr. Lee Gross’s Epiphany Healthcare provides DPC services for some of the employees and some members of of some of their families at a hospital in Florida. Some hospital employees decline Epiphany; they and some members of their families receive instead traditional insurance based primary care. Unusually for such arrangements, a recent assessment of theContinue reading “Epiphany. Dr Gross’s risk adjustment metholodogy for direct primary care stands contrary to contemporary understandings of how to assess the relative expected costs of differing populations.”

CHANGED GRADE: The mixed bag of Milliman earns a final grade: B+

Skillful actuarial work on risk adjustment. A clear warning against relying on studies that ignored risk adjustment. Implicit repudiation of a decade of unfounded brags. An admirable idea on “isolating the impact of DPC model” from the bad decisions of a studied employer. Milliman should have recognized that the health service resources that go intoContinue reading “CHANGED GRADE: The mixed bag of Milliman earns a final grade: B+”